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Review Essay
American Liberals and Judicial Activism:
Alexander Bickel's Appeal from the New to the Old
MAURICE

J.

HOLLAND*

I.
Before his death in November 1974, Alexander Bickel ranked
among the handful of American legal scholars who could fairly be
described as men of letters.' This was more than a matter of the lucid
and elegant prose in which, in contributions to Ne~w Republic and Comnmentary over the span of two decades, he illuminated a remarkably
various range of subjects. That Bickel attained to more than conventional professional eminence in his academic speciality of constitutional
law was most owing to the extraordinary breadth of conception he
brought to that pursuit. In a manner more characteristic of the tradition
of English than of American constitutional scholarship, a tradition
exemplified by Dicey, Maitland, and Bagehot, Bickel's writings are
resonant with learning and insight drawn from history, philosophy,
and politics. This enabled him to go far beyond mere case analysis and
doctrinal explication which, however adept, offer little interest to those
not professionally concerned with the field. More than any other figure
of his time, Bickel made constitutional law an important contributing
2
element of the nation's "public philosophy."
*J.D. 1966, LL.M. 1970, Harvard University; Associate Professor of Law, Indiana
University, Bloomington.
1A complete bibliography of Bickel's writings appears in A. Bicxr., THE MonarAzY
OF CoNsENT 143-50 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as BICEL]. Their number is the more
impressive in that he died at age forty-nine. His other books are: Tan UNPUBLISHED
OpwNoNs or M. Justice BRANDEIs (1957); THn LEmsT DAKGEirous BRANrH: Tim SuPREM
CouRT Ar THn BA or POLITICS (1962); Tim N-w AGE oF PoLrrcL REPoaR: THE ErEcTRAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND TaE PARTY Sys= (1968); THE SUPpmm CourT
ra n IDEA or PRoGRsS (1970); RFoPR An CoiNunYur: H ELEcroRA COLLGE,
T
T
CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYsTE
(1971); and, TaE CASELoAD Or T
SUPREum
CouRT AND WAAT, Ir

A YTHING, TO Do ABouT IT (1973).

His contribution to Supreme

Court scholarship will fittingly culminate in the posthumous publication of THE JuDciAa
AND RESPoNSiBLE GOVERUMNT 1910-1921, a volume in the Holmes Devise HrsToRv or
THE SuPmmE CouRT or T=n UN=TED STATES, the manuscript of which Bickel left substantially completed at his death.
2 See W. LiaprA
, TH PuaBuc PHmosory (1955). Lippinann used the term "public
philosophy" to describe society's informed and reasoned debate concerning the translation
of moral values into public policy.
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As his long affiliation with New Republic implied, Bickel's politics
were liberal, though by no means perfervidly so. The two greatest influences on his thought, at least on matters pertaining to the Constitution
and the role of the Supreme Court, were two heroes of American liberalism, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter,' for the latter of whom he
clerked during the 1952 term. Though expressed in a style in which
undertones of irony and gentle skepticism were seldom lacking, Bickel
partook of most of the liberal enthusiasms of the 1950's and 60's with,
until near the end of his life, only an occasional demurrer.
With the publication in 1970 of The Supreme Court and the Idea
of Progress,4 however, Bickel ventured beyond minor caveats about
questions of detail, and espoused what, measured by the stringent orthodoxy of the liberal creed, constituted rank apostasy. He assayed the
work of the Warren Court and pronounced it seriously flawed in many
important respects. Far exceeding the customary professorial license to
pick scholarly nits with one or another decision, The Supreme Court
and the Idea of Progress piqued, even outraged, liberal opinion" by
3

Some reading this might question this characterization as applied to Frankfurter.
Granting every concession to the imprecision of political labels, to doubt Frankfurter's
liberal credentials betrays excessive present-mindedness and lack of historical perspective
about the place of the doctrine of judicial restraint in American political and constitutional
thought prior to the most recent decades. It is to forget that until the advent of the
Warren Court and the civil rights movement, judicial authority generally and judicial
review in particular had been exalted for the most part by conservatives as the ultimate
guardian against populist excesses on the part of legislatures, and was viewed with hostility
by liberals and progressives for the same reason, though, of course, the latter put it
differently.
The New Deal "court-packing" plan of 1937 was merely the culminating episode in
an almost unbroken line of liberal (using the word in the broadest sense to include Jeffersonians, Jacksonians, Lincoln and the Abolitionists, Populists and Progressives) resistance
to judicial pretensions beginning with the Chase impeachment and Jefferson's abortive
assault on the Marshall Court.
Frankfurter's espousal, as a member of the Supreme Court from 1939 to 1962, of the
canons of judicial restraint formulated preeminently by Brandeis was of a piece with his
earlier career as a Bull Moose Republican, LaFollette Progressive, and New Deal "braintruster," as is evidenced by the recently published excerpts from his confidential diaries
under the title: FROM THE DIARIEs OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (Joseph P. Lash ed. 1975)
[hereinafter referred to as LASH]. That Frankfurter as a judge and Bickel as a scholar
came td be criticized, even pilloried, by many contemporary or "new liberals" for adherence
to a conception of the proper limits of judicial power traditionally held by those of that
political persuasion betokened the magnitude of the shift in liberal attitude. Hence, although
the context and issues could scarcely be more different, a resemblance is suggested between

the Bickel of

THE MORALITY OF CONSENT,

appealing to an earlier generation of the party

to which he had given lifelong allegiance, and the Edmund Burke of AN APPEAL FRom THE
Nmw TO THE OLD WHIaGs (1791), who was similarly estranged from, and abused by the
new leaders of his party.
4 Delivered as the 1969 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School, and
subsequently published in book form in 1970.
5Among those most piqued was Judge J. Skelly Wright of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. See Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and
the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971). As it would have been obviously inap-
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proposing reservations about what its admirers commonly regarded as
the Court's most luminous triumphs during Earl Warren's Chief Justiceship: school integration6 and legislative reapportionment.T Still more

jarring, on a more general plane Bickel questioned the validity of what
had become the principal theme sounded, indeed intoned in the manner
of an incantation, by liberals in justification of the Court's unprecedented
activism during that period;" namely, that the quantity and quality of
propriate for any of the Warren Court Justices to take up cudgels against Bickel, even by
the relaxed standards of judicial aloofness occasionally shown by some of them, that task
could not have fallen to anyone more fitting than judge Wright, of whom it might have
been said, in the sense it was said of Judge Learned Hand vis-i-vis the Court of his time,
that he was the "tenth Justice" during the period of Earl Warren's Chief Justiceship.
Judge Wright dismissed Bickel as one of a coterie of "scholastic mandarins," id. at 777,
owing allegiance to "the ancient regime," id. at 790, whose "[i]deal Justices would become
adept
at sitting on their hands . . . " Id. at 782.
6
Bickel did not retract his earlier, unqualified approval of the original desegregation
decisions. For his eloquent defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
see Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAav. L. REv. 1
(1955). Rather, his criticism was directed at the Court's insistence, beginning in the late
1960's, upon the achievement of "racial balance" by mandatory busing if necessary. See
A. BIcmm, Tim SuPREmsm COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 130-51 (1970). By transforming the right recognized in Brown of black schoolchildren not to be excluded from a public
school on account of race into a right to attend a school wherein the minority-majority
ratio is proportional to that prevailing in the general population of the school district,
the Court, Bickel charged, was arbitrarily exalting one educational value, and that one of
dubious and untested character, against others which, at least in the aggregate, might have
much greater practical consequences for the quality of education.
7A. BzcxmL, TBE SUPREmm COURT AND TE IDEA o PROGRESS 151-75 (1970).
8 If activism can be measured at least in part by innovation, then the general impression that the Warren Court was unprecedentedly activist is no illusion. As striking as any
quantitative measure of just how innovative it was is that during the sixteen terms of the
Warren Chief Justiceship the Court expressly overruled prior Supreme Court holdings
interpreting the Constitution on thirty-one occasions, compared with twenty-seven such
express overrulings during the previous 163 years of its history. These figures may be
more significant for this purpose than a comparison of the number of invalidations of
federal and state statutes by the Warren Court with the number of previous invalidations,
although the latter certainly also support the impression of extraordinary activism. The
Warren Court invalidated federal legislation on twenty-two occasions, as compared with
sixty-nine by its predecessors. With regard to state legislation, the numbers are' 167 and
575, respectively. See TE CoNSTTruTioN o T=E UNITED STATES or AymICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATiON, S. Doc. No. 82, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1597-1797 (L. Jayson, J. Killian,
S. Beckey & T. Durbin ed. 1973).
Of course, the concept of judicial activism is far too elusive to be captured satisfactorily
by such grossly quantitative indices. If activism were to be intelligibly measured, some
means would have to be devised to take account of, among other qualitative factors, the
importance and recency of the decisions overruled, the life-span of the overruled interpretations and the political "weight" behind various enactments struck down. Purely on the
quantitative level, adjustment would somehow have to be made for the increasing volume
of legislation on the federal and state levels, as well as, in the case of overrulings, the
fact that rejection of prior holdings could not be expected during the earliest decades of
the Court's existence. In addition, there is obvious difficulty with focusing solely on
"express" overrulings. Everyone is aware that much overruling is accomplished sub silentio
by purporting to distinguish earlier decisions. Some might even say that the Warren
Court's proclivity for express overrulings was more a tribute to its candor than a mark
of its activism. Finally, as a matter of definition, to speak of "the Warren Court" implies
that a unique institutional character coincided with Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice.
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its interventions, its jettisonings of precedent, its shunting aside of so

many tenets of self-restraint, were all uniquely warranted because of
supposed defaults and derelictions on the part of the representative
organs of government, both federal and state.' In their venality, cowardice, or cumbersomeness, these bodies had, according to this view,
permitted an unacceptable number of recalcitrant "problems" to accumulate on the agenda of national reform. Hence, the Court was left with
no alterndtive b5ut t6 act boldly when the r~presentative br-aiches, surely
not for any reasons having to do with their being representative, proved
themselves unwilling or unable to do so. In the area of voting, for
example, an image was conjured up of the Justices indulgently waiting
decades for state legislatures to finally reapportion themselves according
to what was at last revealed in 1964 to be the constitutionally mandated
formula of "one man, one vote." Their patience exhausted, they simply
had to act and purge the anomoly of "malapportionment."1 °
For commentators like Professor Cox, the only difficulties attendant
upon the long-overdue reform of reapportionment stemmed from the
fact that the dawning of this new day occurred under judicial auspices.
Needless to say, the majorities which during the period 1954 to 1969 overruled prior
constitutional interpretations did not always include Chief Justice Warren, and even when
they did, they necessarily included Justices who were members of the Court either before
or after his tenure; in the cases of Justices Black and Douglas, both. Nevertheless, granting
full force to- all of these qualifications, the statistical comparisons are dramatic enough to
furnish underpinning for what everyone knows impressionistically-namely, that from
the time roughly coinciding with Chief Justice Warren's appointment, the Court began
behaving quite differently from the past.
9
Archibald Cox is as distinguished as any scholarly spokesman for this point of view.
See A. Cox, THE WARR EN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMZENT OF REFORM
(1968) [hereinafter cited as WARREN COURT]. He reflected awareness of what he called
"the basic dilemma of constitutional adjudication," id. at 13, when he conceded that:
The problem is more complex for those who think partly in institutional
terms and believe that in the long run human events may be profoundly influenced
by the allocation of power among governmental agencies and by the way in which
the judiciary exercises its share of power-more complex not because they are
any less enthusiastic over the substantive progress but because it has been accompanied by major institutional changes whose long-range consequences are
difficult to measure and which the present Court sometimes seems to brush aside
without careful consideration in its enthusiasm for immediate progress.
Id. at 13.
This book evidently grew out of Professor Cox's sense that the Warren Court could
well do with something in the way of an apologia. The justifications he gives for the
"institutional changes" wrought by the Court are cast essentially in terms of approval
for the "substantive progress"-that is, the political results it mandated. The balance in
favor of the Court is ultimately struck not merely by approval of these results, but also
by the belief that they were not otherwise attainable through the ordinary political
processes. To some it might seem odd that a scholarly justification for the Court's more
than occasional failure to observe the limitations which differentiate the functions of
adjudication from legislation should rest upon considerations wholly applicable to the
latter.
'Old.at 114-20.
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Of these, there were quite a number, not the least of which was a recent
Supreme Court decision" squarely holding legislative apportionment a
non-justiciable political question. It might be added that everything
theretofore understood about the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment suggested it had little, if anything at all, to do with
how states apportioned their legislatures. Though the balance was close,
such "institutional difficulties" were outweighed for Professor Cox by
the fact that the reapportionment decisions, after all, constituted a great
reform. If this quality about them was not self-evident, he went on to
explain that they should on balance be applauded because their tendency
was "egalitarian," and because state legislatures such as Tennessee's
"had failed to adapt themselves to the burgeoning problems of an urban,
industrialized society." 12 Finally, to dispel any remaining doubt and
clinch the point, the familiar incantation was intoned in terms of "the
stark fact that the cancer of malapportionment would continue to grow
unless the Court excised it."13
If any one person could be said to have lead the Warren Court's
cheering section throughout the 1960's, cuing his readers in applause for
each bold advance and innovative breakthrough, it was Anthony Lewis
of The New York Times. By the middle of the decade, Lewis's widelyesteemed coverage of the Court earned him a regular place among the
Times's columnists, in which position he was freer to move from mere
reporting to interpretation of its noble doings. For Lewis it was as selfevident as it was for Professor Cox that the country's ordinary agencies
of legal change had broken down to the point where there was no alternative but for the Court to pick up the torch of reform and, to mix
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
WMMN CouRT, supra note 9, at -15. Of course, Professor Cox is entitled to his
opinion about the performance of Tennessee's or any other state's legislature, though one
can only marvel at the Olympian heights he must have attained to make such a sweeping
judgment. What weight should be assigned, for example, to a legislature's refusal to "adapt
to the burgeoning problems" by plunging into huge budget deficits and imposing
taxes at a level which drives job-creating industry to other states? More to the point,
what weight should the justices assign to such clearly political decisions in determining
whether an issue like apportionment should cease to be deemed non-justiciable?
18ld. at 117-18. This familiar justification for the repudiation of the prior, long-settled
understanding that legislative apportionment is a "political question!' rings slightly false
in light of the fifteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twentysLxth amendments. Each of these reflected a political decision by those benefitting from
an existing arrangement of the franchise to extend it in favor of people then excluded
from it, and required no prompting from the Supreme Court. They also pose a serious,
if not insuperable, doctrinal obstacle to the Court's holding that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment has anything to do with how the franchise is distributed,
much less that it imposes a constitutional requirement of anything like mathematical
equality in voting weight. This point, pressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964), was not even mentioned in passing in Chief justice
,Warren's opinion for the Court.
11
12
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metaphors slightly, run with it. Thus, speaking of the reapportionment
cases, Lewis declared:
Moreover, the national conscience had found no way to express
itself except through the Supreme Court. The Court moved in only
when the rest of our governmental system was stymied, when there
was no other practical way out of the moral dilemma.
The conclusion is that the Supreme Court has tended in recent
years to act as the instrument of national moral values that have not
been able to find other governmental expression. If the Court has
14
changed, it is because we have changed.
Leaving to one side why Tennessee or any other state should be
compelled to organize its legislature in accordance with something called
"the national moral conscience," one might be lead to wonder why, if
in fact "we have changed," that change was not reflected by the representative branches, and precisely how the Court knew when "the rest
of our governmental system [was] stymied," so that it was time for it
to "move in," rather in the manner of an occupying force. Some enlightenment in this regard was surely called for, lest some naive reader
jump to the conclusion that, by the premises of democratice self-government, "national moral values that have not been able to find ... governmental expression" other than through the Court ought not find expression at all, at least in the mandatory terms of supreme law. Happily, Lewis also helpfully explained that "the Federal legislative path to
reform was blocked by the South's power in the Senate."' 5
What marvelous new vistas in constitutional jurisprudence were
revealed in that last phrase! A wholly new and heroic dimension of Supreme Court jurisdiction comes splendidly into view. With all of their
other, more conventional preoccupations, the Justices are each to keep
one eye cocked on "the national moral conscience" and another on the
"Federal legislative path to reform." Whenever the latter is "stymied"
or "blocked" by "the South's power in the Senate," or possibly other
obstacles equally nefarious, the stage is set for the Court to "move in."
Of course, the Court cannot enforce upon the Tennessee legislature or
anybody else anything quite as lacking in jural status as "national moral
values" per se. Yet for Justices equipped to say when "the rest of our
governmental system is stymied," translating them into something approaching conventional constitutional doctrine is not likely to prove an
insuperable task, though an occasional ipse dixit might have to be re14 Lewis,

Historic Change in the Supreme Court, in THE

WARREN 78-79 (L. Levy ed. 1972).

15 Id.at 77.

SUPREME CouRT UNDER EARL
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sorted to in a pinch. In fact, more than once during the Warren period,
the task proved to be mere child's play. Matters were considerably facilitated by a child-like capacity to ignore unpleasant things which might
upset the play, such as that the "South's power in the Senate" was
for more unambiguously derived from the Constitution than the mandate of "one man, one vote."
Lewis's remark about the South was revealing of another theme
which ran through much of the W~irren Court's adulation by liberals
of the period. That is, whoever constituted the "we [who] have changed"
and were the keepers of the "national moral conscience," they did not
include Southerners. When Lewis spoke of the national conscience which
the Court was to consult, he did not mean to be taken quite literally, as
most Times readers can safely be assumed to have understood.
It was characteristic of Bickel to be mordantly impatient with
moralizing cant even, or perhaps especially, when uttered in the name
of political goals with which he in the main sympathized. At some risk
to his liberal credentials, Bickel's appraisal of the reapportionment decisions was caustic:
It remains to ask whether we have evolved or can see emerging
some other operative principle-other than equal representationwhich is capable of general application. Neither the Supreme Court
nor any of the other courts that have been busily tackling the problem
has come within shouting distance of such a principle ....
[W] hen
things are to be decided on hunch or out of thin air, . .. it is a fixed
characteristic of our system that we let the political institutions do
it. The political institutions reflect the people, even if imperfectly,
and they include a governor responsive to the majority. Malapportioned though they may be, they are more easily subject to correction
and more nearly responsible and responsive than courts, which do
not suffer from malapportionment, because they are not apportioned,
nor are they representative. It is an irony.., that the superdemocrats
look to the unrepresentative courts for an arbitrary decision which
they resent when it is made by a faultily representative legislature,
acting in concert with a majoritarian governor.16
II
In the posthumous collection of essays entitled The Morality of
Consent, Bickel was not concerned with flaying the Warren Court,
much about which he admired, albeit with some ambivalence. Rather,
his purpose in the chapter'" to which this essay is addressed was to
ISA.

BICKEL, POLITICS AND TIM WARRE

COURT 188 (1965).

17 Chapter 1, entitled Constitutionalism and the Political Process. Subsequent chapters

are: Citizen or Person? What Is Not Granted Cannot Be Taken Away; Domesticated Civil
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reflect, from a perspective afforded by the thought of Edmund Burke,
upon the place of a written constitution in the totality of American
political processes-a written constitution, moreover, many of whose
most important provisions are cast open-endedly in terms of the greatest
generality, and whose meaning is left for final and authoritative pronouncement by non-elected, life-tenured judges. This theme is at once
the most engrossing and the most perdurable of that strand of political
philosophy that goes under the rubric of constitutionalism-how to
reconcile with the central premise of popular self-government a scheme
of constitutional adjudication which to a greater or lesser degree tends
to displace elected representatives in the resolution of questions of moral
value and policy preference. It is a theme demanding an understanding
informed both by history and philosophy, but which has more often inspired little more than banalities about counter-majoritarian restraints
on legislative excess and the need for leavening our supposedly interestdominated politics with occasional injections of principle.
Whether or not in sympathy with Bickel's views on the subject,
they are not likely to impress the reader as banal. American constitutionalism is considered from a vantage point which might, at first blush,
be thought unusefully remote if not wholly alien to it-the English Whig
tradition as epitomized in the writings of Edmund Burke.
Burke will no doubt strike many as an odd source to consult for
wisdom about any contemporary American institution, not the least
about the modern Supreme Court. To the meager extent he is today
associated with anything by anybody, apart from specialists in the history of political thought and devotees of English Augustan prose style,
it would certainly be with his great philipic against the principles
of the French Revolution. 8 The latter have, as Bickel conceded, long
ago won the day, and in winning have cast Burke in the role of a cranky
if eloquent-grandiloquent some would say"---defender of privilege,
Disobedience: The First Amendment, from Sullivan to the Pentagon Papers; Civil Disobedience, Revolution, and the Legal Order; and Moral Authority and the Intellectual.
18 See E. BURxE, REPLECTioNS ON THE IZEVOLuTION I N FRANcE (Todd ed. 1959) (1st
ed. London 1790) [hereinafter referred to as REFLECrioNS]. Citations to works of Burke

other than

REFLECTiONS are to SELECTED WRTINGS Or EDmUND Buaicn (W.

J. Bate ed.

1960) [hereinafter referred to as WRITINGS], except as otherwise expressly indicated.
19As representative as any passage of Burke's eloquence, or grandiloquence, is the
following famous one from REFLECTIONS, supra note 18:
But the age of chivalry is gone.-That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever. Never
more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission,
that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, . . .
the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defense
of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic, enterprise is gone! It is gone,
that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honor, which-felt a stain like a wound,
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prejudice and the ancien regime. Probably because the later writings,
which retain the greatest literary interest, are also those wherein Burke's
politics appear most reactionary, one can easily forget that he was first
and foremost a reformer, a staunch defender of the House of Commons'
constitutional prerogatives as against the Crown under the revolutionary
settlement of 1688, an advocate of reconciliation with the American colonies on terms which foretold many features of the modern Commonwealth, and a spokesman both for Catholic toleration and amelioration
of Irish conditions. Had he not lived just long enough to be overtaken
by revulsion at the wave of initial enthusiasm for the supposed principles
of the French Revolution which swept over Europe, a revulsion heightened to a pitch of magestic rage at what he exaggerately took to be a
conversion to those principles on the part of the "New Whigs,"' 2 Burke
would today be less remembered, but more favorably, as a benevolent
champion of moderate, timely, and practical reform.
Since the age and society in which Burke lived were so markedly
different from our own, anyone looking to his writings for illumination
of contemporary issues and institutions must borrow at the level of
mood and spirit rather than of specific pronouncements. Most of the
latter were simply too topical and ad hoc to have direct application today, two centuries after they were made. Distilling the mood and spirit
of Burke is the more difficult because he was not given to discoursing at
large on political theory in the manner of a Locke or Hume. His only
systematic work not more or less directly responsive to some discrete
event or provocation was A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of
Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, an early essay on aesthetic
psychology written before politics became his all-consuming preoccupation.
which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it
touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.
Id. at 91-92.
2
oIn the spring of 1791, Charles James Fox, the leader of the "New Whigs," casually
spoke some words in the House of Commons in praise of the work of the revolutionary
French National Assembly. Burke took this as an implied aspersion on his just-published
REFLEcTrOs, supra note 18. Enraged, he replied with an outburst during which he likened
the younger Whig members who shouted him down as out of order to "the barking little
dogs" of King Lear. When Fox later tried to mollify Burke by saying that they could stay
friends, the latter replied that all friendship was at an end. The episode is recounted in
29 PARIIAaSENTARy HisToRY 363-428 (1890). Burke described Englishmen who sympathized
with the French Revolution as "a sect of fanatical and ambitious atheists," WarrIGs, supra
note 18, at 482, and as "literary caballers and intriguing philosophers [and] political theologians and theological politicians," REFLEcIoNs, supra note 18, at 10. In an age notorious
for the unbridled and ingenious terms of abuse exchanged between political opponents,
Burke was unsurpassed.
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In his application of what he distilled from Burke to American
constitutionalism, Bickel identified "[t]wo diverging traditions in the
mainstream of Western political thought . . . both of which have controlled in the direction of our judicial policy at one time or another":
One of these, the contractarian tradition, began with the moderate
common sense of John Locke. It was pursued by Rousseau, and it long
ago captured, and substantially retains possession of, the label liberal,
although I would contest its title to it. The other tradition can, for
lack of a better term, be called Whig in the English eighteenth-century
sense. It is usually called conservative, and I would
associate it chiefly
2
with Edmund Burke. This is my own model. 1
Since both traditions can be traced to a common source, Locke's
Two Treatises of Government, Bickel was surely right in describing
them as "diverging" rather than opposed. The Treatises were not only
the classic exposition of the contractarian theory of government but
also the major polemical defense of the constitutional settlement brought
about by the "Glorious Revolution." The preservation of this settlement,
founded upon the twin pillars of the "mixed constitution" and the
Protestant succession, was what brought the Whig party into existence,
and remained its unifying principle until near the end of Burke's parliamentary career. By that time, the mixed constitution was established beyond assault, and new political alignments took shape around the issue
of what England's response should be to the French Revolution and its
egalitarian doctrines. The "New Whigs," from whom Burke appealed,
for a time welcomed both, in the quaint belief that the French revolutionaries were merely acting like Englishmen, dealing with Louis XVI
as the "Old Whigs" had dealt with James II a century before.
Interesting as all this lineage might be to the historian, Bickel's
purpose, directed to the present, was to adduce the contrasting characteristics of the Whig and contractarian traditions, and to commend the
former as furnishing a sounder approach to politics. He outlined the
salient differences as follows:
The liberal contractarian model rests on a vision of individual
rights that have a clearly defined, independent existence predating
society and are derived from nature and from a natural, if imagined,
contract. Society must bend to these rights.... They condition everything, and society operates within limits they set. Deduced from
premises that cannot be questioned closely, they must themselves be
deduced by pure reason.
The Whig model, on the other hand, begins not with theoretical
rights but with a real society, whose origins in the historical mists it
21 BicKEL, supra note 1, at 3.
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acknowledges to be mysterious. The Whig model assesses human
nature as it is seen to be. It judges how readily and how far men can
be moved by means other than violent, that is to say, how far they
can be moved by government. The values of such a society evolve, but
as of any particular moment they are taken as given. Limits are set
by culture, by time- and place-bound conditions, and within these
limits the task of government informed by the present state of values
is to make a peaceable, good, and improving society. That, and not
anything that existed prior to society itself and that now exists independently of society, is what men have a right to. The Whig model
obviously is flexible, pragmatic, slow-moving, highly political. It partakes, in substantial measure, of the relativism that pervades Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes's theory of the First Amendment, although not
to its ultimate logical exaggeration.
The contractarian model, in contrast, is committed not to law
alone but to a parochial faith in a closely calibrated scale of values.
It is moral, principled, legalistic, ultimately authoritarian. It is weak
on pragmatism, strong on theory. For it, law is not so much a process,
and certainly not a process in continual flux, as it is a body of rules
binding all, rules that can be changed only by the same formal method
by which they were enacted. The relationship between the individual
and government is defined by law; as are the entire public life of the
society and, indeed, the society itself.
In the liberal contractarian view, the limits on majority rule
through appeal to the Constitution tend to be absolute, timeless, in
response to the resistance of a majority, or even a minority. Most
of life is seen in moral rather than prudential terms. None of the
pragmatic skepticism so salient in the Whig model infects the Constituition of the contractarian. This was Justice Hugo Black's Constitution, a storehouse of principles, inflexible and numerous . . . . The
Warren Court in its heyday was Hugo Black writ large.P
The foregoing antitheses are all very well, but one might ask how
they are pertinent to American constitutionalism and, more particularly,
to the place of the Supreme Court in the American polity. The question
thus posed is shortly answered upon reflection that constitutional adjudication in this country has come to be one of the prime modes of governance-governance in the sense of the process by which sovereign
choices among competing values and policies are finally and conclusively
made for society, as opposed to merely applied or enforced. It may to
a degree have been so since the beginning, but the variety and importance
of the issues in recent years preempted from legislative in favor of judicial resolution leave little doubt that judges, Supreme Court Justices in
22 Id. at 4-9.
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the final instance, now wield an unexampled share of sovereign authority. The manner in which this authority is exercised is in large measure determined by how those exercising it conceive that society is best
and most justly ordered. It is about such conceptions that the Whig and
the contractarian traditions afford important and significantly differing
teachings.
Since the Progressive Era there has been no serious assertion that
there is inherent in the Court's role in governance anything sinister or
usurpacious,2" though vehement hostility has of course persisted in response to specific decisions and lines of decisions. The Court's role in
governance has for some time been conceded, with greater or lesser
equanimity, to be necessarily entailed in the institution of judicial review,
however bitterly the specific decisions might be denounced. Even if
Charles Evans Hughes's oft-quoted remark that "the Constitution is
' has not been accepted in a
what the judges say it is" 24
literal sense, as
it was not meant to be, still most would ascribe a greater measure of
truth to it than to the quaint account of the Court's function left by
his fellow-Justice, Owen Roberts, in United States v. Butler." Indeed,
23L. BOUD,
GOVER1MENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) represented the last in a series of
scholarly attacks on the institution of judicial review by writers of varying Progressive
hues. Thus, Walter Clark in GovERNMENT BY JUDvES (1914) and William Trickett in
The Newest Neologism of the Supreme Court, 41 AzR. L. REv. 729 (1907) and The
Great Usurpation, 40 AxER. L. REv. 356 (1906) attempted serious arguments to the effect
that judicial review was a usurpation not intended by the Founding Fathers. More wellknown were Herbert Croly and Charles Beard, who in THE PRoMIsE or AmEcAw LIFE
(1909) and TRE SuPREM COURT AND THE CoNsrrrrsoN (1912), respectively, conceded
the historic legitimacy of judicial review, but regretted it and urged that it be abolished
or curtailed by constitutional amendment. Some of their less drastic proposals, such as
recall of judges or judicial decisions, were taken up by Theodore Roosevelt as the "Bull
Moose" candidate for president in 1912. Hostility towards judicial review remained a
staple of the Progressive Movement through the 1920's and reemerged in the New Dealers'
"court-packing" plan of 1937. Felix Frankfurter was one of the formulators of Robert
LaFollette's platform plank in 1924 which called for a constitutional amendment giving
Congress power to override Supreme Court invalidation of federal statutes by a two-thirds
vote. Frankfurter even advanced the modest proposal of excising-the due process clause
from the fourteenth amendment. See Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform,
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1924, at 110. For an illuminating discussion of Frankfurter's place
in this movenent, see Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in LASr, supra note 3, at 3.
24
Address at Elmira, New York, May 3, 1907, quoted in M. PusLY, CHARars EvANs
HUGHES 204-05 (1963). The remark, which later proved something of an embarrassment
to him when he became first an Associate and then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
was made by Hughes when he was Governor of New York. He was at the time embroiled
in a controversy over the scope of judicial review of orders of a public utility rate commission he had pioneered in establishing. Something of a progressive, he favored an extremely limited scope of review.
25 297

U.S. 1 (1935).

Justice Roberts stated:
There should be no minunderstanding as to the function of this court in such
a case. It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or
control the action of the people's representatives. This is a misconception. .The
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given the characteristic textual vagueness of the constitutional provisions which have been invoked in support of the most frequent and
broad-gauged judicial interventions, and further given the obscurity of
the framers' and ratifiers' historic intent regarding such provisions, it
may be only a slight exaggeration to conclude that the fact of the American Constitution being a written one, so much relied upon by John Marshall in his argument for judicial review, 2 no longer has much practical
limiting effect in controlling the Court's results. So far has the notion
come to prevail that the Justices are charged with "keep[ing] the Constitution up-to-date" and "bring[ing] it into harmony with the times"
that Justice Black's dissenting jibe that the Court was acting in the
manner of "a continuously functioning constitutional convention" 27
should rate as more than a mere rhetorical stoke. If the Court assumes
an active, constitutive role, in addition to its formally defined interpretive
one, in that mode of governance carried out under the form of constitutional adjudication, then it is surely appropriate to assess its performance
according to the larger precepts of political philosophy.
Bickel suggested a number of ways in which Burkean precepts
might be reflected in the Court's performance. Perhaps foremost among
these would be greater sensitivity and deference to what he called "evolving principle."2' 8 This was his term for the idea, central in Burke's conception of society and social change, that the growth and transformations
of a political community's core values and ruling norms should occur
through a gradual, incremental process of evolution over time, on the
model of natural evolution. For Burke, human societies are not atomistic
aggregations of individuals associated with one another primarily in the
juristic way of parties to a contract, with rights and obligations precisely
defined in some more or less explicit social compact alterable only by
recourse to formally prescribed procedures. They are, instead, organic
communities whose constituent elements-social classes, vocations, volunConstitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by the people
...
. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government
has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former.
Id. at 62.
The picture which emerges of Justice Roberts from the Frankfurter diaries is that of
a virtuoso of naivete. Frankfurter concurred in Justice Black's description of him as
"the most naive man I have ever known in my life-a fine character but as innocent as
a child." Frankfurter himself compared him to one "of whom I once said that experience
passes
through him without stopping." LASH, supra note 3, at 174-75.
26
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
27
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967).
25 Bxcxni, supra note 1, at 25 et seq.
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tary associations of various kinds, localities, and religious groups-are
differentiated in function and hierarchically ordered in their relationships.
As with natural organisms, societies must constantly evolve in order to
flourish, but this must "proceed by insensible degrees."2 9
A society's vital, animating core inheres, in Burke's view, in its
moral values as expressed not only in the private virtues it esteems but
also in its public morality, the latter consisting of those norms of conduct insisted upon with varying degrees of rigor and enforced through
positive law, social conventions, and the nurture of succeeding generations. No less than with a society's institutional forms and structures,
societal values must be left free to evolve in organic, integral relationship with all of its constituent elements. In order to claim authenticity
and legitimacy, they must emerge from the warp and woof of the social
fabric, from its ethos, in a way which maintains continuity from generation to generation. Values cannot be mechanistically imposed, as by
decree, lest the subtle and largely implicit coherence which is the source
both of society's stability and its vitality be disordered.8"
Soundly conceived, government is the servant, not the master, of
society. It must reflect the latter as it is and has been. Its function is to
preserve and defend, and not to reshape society nor impose new values
upon it. Reform is essential, but it must be practical rather than idea29

Letter to Sir Hercules Langrische on the Catholics, 3 WoaKs OF EDMUND BURE 340
(Bohn ed. 1848) [hereinafter referred to as WORKS]. The gradual diminution, nearly to
the point of disappearance, of the actual constitutional authority of the British monarch
from Burke's time to the present illustrates the advantage which accrues to a society

from evolutionary change "by insensible degrees." The gradual, painless paring away of
such authority by a process of general, tacit consent, accompanied by the retention of
formal, ceremonial power, in a manner which avoided frontal assaults on, and theoretical
scrutiny, of the institution, has enabled Britain to avoid the rankling fissures produced
by the sudden, outright abolition of other European monarchies. Britain has had its
share of divisive issues, but the position of the Crown has not figured importantly among
them since George III's attempt to conduct an extra-parliamentary ministry was defeated
by Burke and his "Old Whig" allies.
So In his organic conception of society, his veneration for sentiment and tradition, and
his celebration of a distinct national ethos, Burke anticipated many lineaments of nineteenthcentury political thought. His analogies of society to nature assumed a natural order
more Lamarkian, even Darwinian, than the static, mechanistic, symmetrical, Newtonian
depiction of nature from which most eighteenth-century political thinkers drew. In the
decades immediately following his death in 1797, Burke enjoyed far more of a reputation
in Germany than in England, in the former of which Newtonian rationalism had not
enjoyed much of a vogue, and where the burgeoning Romantic Movement gained expression
in the realm of political thought as well as in music and literature. The dessicated rationalism
of John Stuart Mill's "philosophical radicalism"--i.e. classical liberalism-and the arid
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, which together dominated English political thought in
the first half of the nineteenth-century, were conducive to a climate of opinion quite
uncongenial to Burke's ideas. Appreciation of Burke in England was for the most part
confined to such literary figures as Coleridge and Southey. See generally G. SABINE, A
HISTORY OF POLITICAL TnEoRy 607-19 (3rd ed. 1961); A. COBBAN, EDIEUND BURKE AND
TM

RtvoLT AGAINST TH

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1929).
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logical in inspiration and purpose. Reform should in the main consist
of measures which government imposes upon itself, the better to adapt
itself to society rather than the opposite. Burke's model of society was
by-no means static, but change must well up from the springs of popular
mores and sentiment, not from any programatically formulated scheme
or platform concocted by some neoteric faction, whether of the rulers
or the ruled.
When values are transformed from mere customs and conventions,
informally enforced by exhortation or disapproval, into positive law, there
must be a focal point, an institution or set of institutions empowered to
register, clarify and formulate them in mandatory terms-in short, to
legislate. In the England of Burke, that institution was the King in
Parliament, the legitimacy of which did not rest upon democratic premises. In the present-day United States, where democratic premises are
assumed to prevail, the legislative function is vested in those organs of
government whose accountability to the people legitimate their registering, clarifying and formulating societal values in the latter's behalf: the
Congress, the President, and the legislatures and governors of the
states. This is, of course, what ordinarily does occur, except when the
process is overridden, and its allocation of decision-making power displaced, by the intervention of judicial review.
Anyone not prepared to re-argue Marbury v. Madison3 ' must concede -that there are some circumstances where the task of formulating
and mandating values is removed from its normal locus in the political
branches and vested in the courts-finally in the Supreme Court. Putting
aside the easy and relatively rare instances in which a statute approaches
literal repugnancy to some provision of the Constitution, the problem is
determining under what other circumstances this shift in the locus of
governance should occur.
A problem attains the dignity of a dilemma when it is generally
conceded that it defies any clear-cut, good-for-all-cases solution. Bickel
wrote perceptively about Frankfurter's heroic but ultimately unavailing
search for some comprehensive principle by which to identify and rationalize the occasions on which departures from what was for him the
norm of judicial restraint were warranted,"2 and by no means claimed
to have discovered such a principle himself. In Burke, however, he discerned some broad political principles which, when joined with a Frankfurterian conception-i.e., the traditional, pre-Warren Era conception
3

1Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 Felix Frankfvxter z882-z965, NEw REPuBLic, Mar. 6, 1965, at 7.
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held by American liberals-of the proper role of courts, yielded, if not
an answer, at least a method of approach.
The starting point is appreciation of Burke's teaching that the
fundamental values which lend vitality and coherence to society are only
in part, and not the greater part, rational constructs logically deducible
from any set of abstract propositions. They are, rather, amalgams of
sentiment, tradition, instinct, prejudice, and, especially important for
Burke, religious conviction. These were precisely the sources of value
judgments which the "New Whigs" of Burke's time, bemused by the
French philosophes' assault on tradition and religion, were determined to
replace with the tenets of Enlightenment rationalism. Burke's writings
from his later years, when the latter seemed to him to be becoming dangerously fashionable in England, are studded with expressions of scorn
for the notion that men can be governed according to "metaphysical"his favorite term of opprobrium-"speculations":
Man acts from adequate motives relative to his interest, and
not on metaphysical speculations. Aristotle, the great master of reasoning, cautions us... against this species of delusive geometrical accu3
racy in moral arguments, as the most fallacious of all sophistry. 3
There are people who have split and atomized the doctrine of
free government, as if it were an abstract question concerning metaphysical liberty and necessity, and not a matter of moral prudence and
natural feeling ....

Civil freedom ...

is not, as many have endeav-

ored to persuade you, a thing that lies hid in the depth of abstruse
science. It is a blessing and a benefit, not an abstract speculation;
and all the just reasoning that can be upon it is of so coarse a texture
as perfectly to suit the ordinary capacities of those who are to enjoy
it, and of those who are to defend it. Far from any resemblance to
those propositions in geometry and metaphysics which admit no
medium, but which must be true or false in all their latitude, social
and civil freedom . . . are variously mixed and modified, enjoyed in

very different degrees, and shaped into an infinite diversity of forms,
34
according to the temper and circumstances of every community.
Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters.
The lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics. They
are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they
demand modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not
made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence
is not only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she
is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.35
The foundation of government is ... laid, not in imaginary rights

of man.., but in political convenience, and in human nature-either
83

Speech on Reconciliation with the American Colonies, WRITINGS, supra note 18, at 166.
84 Letter to the Sheriff of Bristol, id. at 210-11.
35 An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, 4 WoRxs, supra note 29, at 81.
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as that nature is universal, or as it is modified by local habits and
social aptitude. The foundation of government is laid in a provision
for our wants and in a conformity to our duties; it is to purvey for
the one, and to enforce the other 38
If the principles and values which inform and direct the life of
society in the United States are to have the Burkean attributes Bickel
commends, the Supreme Court's role in defining and elaborating them
must be a sharply delimited one. This is so because, however wise and
high-minded the members of the Court may be in matters of "moral
prudence and natural feeling" and "political convenience," as Justices
they have no special institutional competence, certainly not such as entitles them to override the deliberate choices of the people as expressed
through the representative branches. Their special competence, which
legitimates judicial review in derogation of the norm of majority rule,
is confined to issues resolvable "by the process of logic," not by "the rules
of prudence."
Burke's phrase "process of logic" is not quite right for present
purposes, since it connotes more of paradigms and syllogisms, of a closedended system of formal premises and conclusions, than what is commonly
encountered in legal reasoning. Professor Wechsler's insistence that
courts adhere to "neutral principles 37 probably corresponds more closely
to what Bickel regarded as the institutional obligation of courts upon
which their special competence rests. This obligation is especially compelling as it relates to judicial review by the Supreme Court, where its
rigorous fulfillment supplies justification not simply for the judgment
which binds the parties as in ordinary litigation, but for the attendant
annulment of the popular will as embodied in the invalidated statute.
For Bickel, as for Burke, if the power of government is to be exercised morally, it must be exercised in conformity with "the morality of
consent," the consent being that of the governed. However such consent
may have been manifested in eighteenth-century England, in twentiethcentury America it is accorded to actions of legislators by-periodic elections at which a universal adult franchise is exercisable. Consent of the
governed is, however, no less requisite for decisions of courts which
are not amenable to legislative correction-i.e., decisions announcing and
applying a rule of constitutional law.
The nature of this latter kind of consent, and the way in which it
is derived, differ importantly from the consent conferred electorally upon

36Id.
at
87

207.

Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 ElAav. L. Rav. 1

(1959).
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legislators. When the rule applied by a court in the exercise of judicial
review can be persuasively demonstrated in a reasoned, principled way
to derive from the Constitution, and not from judges' values and policy
preferences of the sort appropriate to legislative judgment, the morality
of consent is not contravened, even though the will of an electoral majority, as expressed through a legislative majority, is set aside. This
rests, of course, upon the presumed continuing consent of the American
people to be governed according to the principles embodied in the Constitution, as translated into rules of decision by courts, in preference to
whatever conflicting rules might from time to time be formulated by
ordinary legislative majorities. This continuing consent, while concededly savoring of legal fiction, is nonetheless no such mystical thing
as that which English constitutional theory of Burke's time advanced
on behalf of the King in Parliament, because the former can, in a sense,
be actually registered by non-resort to the formally-prescribed process
of constitutional amendment.
Much of the above might be dismissed as civics-book platitudes
which nobody seriously disputes. To be sure, at the level of explicit
avowal there is to be found little disagreement with the proposition that
judicial review can be reconciled with the premises of popular selfgovernment-"the morality of consent" in the American context-only
when the subordinating rule of decision is authentically derived from
the Constitution. Since few, even among the most ardent admirers of
the judicial activism of recent decades, would deny this in theory, the
matter obviously turns upon what qualifies as such a rule. The language
of the document being anything but self-interpreting, and the historic
intent of the framers being typically elusive, there must of necessity be
much recourse to analogizing and extrapolation in order to close the gap
between a pertinent constitutional text and a rule of decision purportedly
derived therefrom. A substantial part of Bickel's insight was in insisting
that the obligation of judges to discipline their analogizing and extrapolating by rigorous adherence to the methods of, and limitations upon,
legal reasoning flows not merely from traditional notions of judicial
technique, but, even more compellingly, from the political values sub8
sumed by the morality of consent. 8
38 This insight did not await the growing reservations about the Warren Court which
Bickel expressed systemmatically only in his last years. As early as 1958 he had written:
The Supreme Court is, of course, compatible with government by the consent
of the governed because it is not free to make policy after the fashion of the
representative institutions. Its process is different. It responds not to pressures, but
to reason. When driven to judgment whose ultimate validity is not demonstrated
by reasoned argumentation, it is guided and restricted in its choices by the meticulously recorded history of upwards of 150 years of litigation, which embodies choices

1976]

REVIEW ESSAY

1043

It would be naive to the point of disingenuousness to suggest that
the methods and techniques of constitutional interpretation resemble
those of, say, a chemistry experiment, in being susceptible of entirely
objective, universally accepted standards of validity. Although not a
science, the process of rendering judgment is, or should be viewed as,
at least a craft, and, as such, sufficiently amenable to the intellectual
disciplines associated with reasoned discourse as to make appraisal possible in terms other than approval or disapproval of the result. Its essential requisite in the context of judicial review consists in the logically
persuasive location of decisional premises in the Constitution and the
rational connection of results with those premises. When the latter is lacking in ordinary, non-constitutional adjudication, the offense is merely
against the punctilios of elegantia juris, a matter of slight moment, at
most ruffling professional sensibilities. When either is lacking in constitutional adjudication, however, the offense is against the polity; the
transgression is against the morality of consent.
III.
Bickel's appeal was from his contemporary fellow-liberals who, he
thought, in their enthusiasm for judicially-mandated results on political
grounds, slighted this morality of process. His appeal was to the more
austere, principled attitude toward judicial power espoused by the likes
of Brandeis and Frankfurter, who insisted, in the terms of Federalist
No. 7 8 ,"g that the office of the judicial branch is to propound judgment
and not to impose will, the latter being a function of the political branches.
No one supposes, and nowhere did Bickel suggest, that judgment is ever
wholly separable from will, but he did find in many of the more luxuriant,
latter-day exertions of judicial activism an undue preponderance of will.
The hallmarks of this were bald assertion, a propensity for discovering
"new meanings" in the Constitution, 40 an indifference to long-settled
and recently-affirmed lines of precedent, a proclivity for ignoring doctried and accepted, or tried and found wanting, before ....
Thus the process is
the all-important thing about the Court, since it is the justification for its existence.
Bickel,
Law and Reason, NEW REPuBLic, Nov. 3, 1958, at 18-19.
39
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, now as in the past the most
apt vehicle for judicial imperiousness, is the obvious example of this thought. The view
of due process espoused by that "Old Liberal," Justice Holmes, was anything but compatible with looking to it as a source of "new meanings":
The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy history
for the States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all exactly alike. If
a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need
a strong case to affect it ....
Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
40THE Fm
nA sr No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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trinal impediments, and occasionally even a foot-stomping disposition to
command without troubling to explain.4 To these might be added a
willingness to exalt certain political values, arguably of constitutional
derivation, to the point of annulling others at least equally discernible in
the Constitution.2
Common to all of these failings was some apparent loss of the
chastening awareness that the finality and preeminence of judges in
expounding the Constitution rests upon the fact that it comes before them
4

1 Typical is the series of per curiam orders following Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Court struck down segregation in a wide range of
public facilities other than public schools. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Mayor of Baltimore
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). The
Justices may have thought the rationale for these decisions self-evident; but given the
degree to which the reasoning of Brown was pitched so narrowly in terms of the supposed
uniqueness of the educational experience and the special harm inflicted on black children
by having to attend segregated schools, some further explanation might well have been
deemed appropriate when the Court was engaged in outlawing an institution which, however
regretably or even reprehensibly, had been so deep-rooted and had so long been constitutionally sanctioned.
42 For example, in the line of decisions removing most of the traditional, state-imposed
qualifications for exercise of the franchise in the name of equality, the Court exalted certain
political values over others equally well supported in the Constitution. See, e.g., Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The
baldly political preference implicit in the Harper decision, in which Virginia's $1.50 poll
tax was struck down, was exposed by justice Harlan in dissent:
Property qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional part of our
political structure. In the Colonies the franchise was generally a restricted one.
'Over the years these and other restrictions were gradually lifted, primarily because
popular theories of political representation had changed ....
Similarly with property qualifications, it is only by fiat that it can be said,
especially in the context of American history, that there can be no rational debate
as to their advisability. Most of the early Colonies had them; many of the States
have had them during much of their histories; and, whether one agrees or not,
arguments have been and still can be made in favor of them. For example, it is
certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax promotes
civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about public affairs
to pay $1.50 or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise. It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage
of Americans throughout most of our history, that people with some property
have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible,
more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the community and Nation would be better managed if the
franchise were restricted to such citizens ....
These viewpoints, to be sure, ring hollow on most contemporary ears ....
Property and poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current
egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy should be organized. It is of course
entirely fitting that legislatures should modify the law to reflect such changes in
popular attitudes. However, it is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt
the political doctrines popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history
and to declare all others to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the
range of choice by reasonably minded people acting through the political process

383 U.S. at 684-86.
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as a species of law, and not as furnishing the pretext for them to play the
part of "Platonic Guardians," 48 much less keepers of the national conscience, as Anthony Lewis would have it. While the pervasive generality
of the text of the Constitution, among other factors, precludes the application to it of the techniques which the law has developed for the construction of authoritative language in precisely the same way as they are
to wills, contracts, or even statutes, the differences should be of degree
and not of kind. The applicability of the canons of construction to constitutional interpretation was once almost unanimously taken for granted
by commentators and judges alike,4 4 but little has been heard of that idea
lately.
Most, if not all, of these objections against the imperiousness of
courts could be, indeed have been, advanced by proponents of judicial restraint without any need of recourse to Burke. While more implied than
explicitly elaborated by Bickel, "vouching in" Burke suggests an additional and different kind of.distortion that can be expected to flow from
overreaching on the part of judges, one that goes beyond undue aggrandizement of power by one branch at the expense of the others. This distortion has to do, not with the forum in which fundamental issues of moral
value and public policy are resolved, but with how such issues are characterized and the terms in which they are addressed. Because of the
conventions which traditionally pertain to the process of adjudication,
issues referred to that mode of resolution must be amenable to definition
48
44

L.HANW, T.Em BrL

oF RIGHTS 73 (1958).

See, e.g., 1 STORY ON THE CONsTrrUTIoN § 400 (2d ed. 1851), where it is stated that

"[t]he first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe
them according to the sense of the terms, and the intents of the parties"; I T. Coo=zv,
A T"E TisE ON TH CONST'nIoNAL LMITATIONS 123-24 (8th ed. 1927), where it is stated:

A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that they are to receive
an unvarying interpretation, and that their practical construction is to be uniform.
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at
some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps
to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A principal share of the
benefit expected from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion.
It is with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and with a
view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond their control, that these
instruments are framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible
change in their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law.
See also South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), where the Supreme Court,
per Justice Brewer, stated:
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter.
That which it meant when adopted it means now. Being a grant of powers to a
government its language is general, and as changes come in social and political life
it embraces in its grasp all new conditions which are within the scope of the powers
in terms conferred ....
This in no manner abridges the fact of its changeless
nature and meaning.
Id. at 448-49.
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and decision by appeal to the categories of logic and the imperatives of
reason, or at least must be made to appear so. When moral and political
questions are engrossed by the judiciary as questions of constitutional
law, they are removed, not just from the purview of the representative
branches, but also from the domain of "evolving principle." Institutional
proprieties require a style and method of decision in which popular sentiment, lay intuition, and inherited convictions, to say nothing of prejudices, are severely put aside, and a thus truncated analysis supposedly
dependent upon professional expertise is asserted to be sufficient.
In no recent decision are the imperious pretensions of adjudication
better illustrated than in Roe v. Wade.4" Aside from an almost cavalier
indifference about locating its governing principle in the Constitution,
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court threaded a few dubiously connected syllogisms through a miscellany of facts about human gestation to
reach a solution to the abortion dilemma whose entitlement to rank as
part of the supreme law of the land rests upon the supposition that treatment of the issue could be wholly enclosed within the parameters of
legal reasoning. Were this not supposed, there would be no justification
for withdrawing the question from the processes whereby evolving popular attitudes are permitted to continue to shape and mould the law.
Another subject, much involved with tradition, sentiment, and
religious convictions, about which popular attitudes have been distinctly
evolving is the relationship between men and women in contemporary
American society. This evolution has been importantly reflected politically
by a wide range of legislation at the federal and state levels abolishing
many of the disabilities and inequalities formerly imposed upon women,
and by the continuing struggle over the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. Yet a plurality of the Supreme Court was prepared in Frontiero
v. Richardson46 to, in effect, remove these issues from the arena of political controversy, wherein evolving principle is expressed in law, and claim
them for resolution by adjudication. This it was prepared to do by assimilating sexual classifications to racial ones and declaring them similarly "suspect." Racial classifications had acquired their suspect or invidious character by means of the moral and political judgments repre45410 U.S. 113 (1973) (power of states to restrict access to abortions substantially
curtailed as violative of due process). In citing Roe as epitomizing judicial activism and
encroachment on the legislative domain, Bickel implicitly acknowledged that the Court's
disposition toward free-wheeling interventions had by no means ended, if indeed it has
substantially abated, with the retirement of Chief Justice Warren and the accession of
the Nixon appointees.
46411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating statutory distinction as between male and female
Armed Forces members respecting proof of spousal dependency).
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sented in the Reconstruction Amendments. Justice Brennan was of a
mind to short-cut the cumbersomeness of the amending procedure and
pronounce a judicial doom on legislation reflecting a persistence of what
he called an "attitude of romantic paternalism"4 7 toward women, which
attitude he disapprovingly conceded to be "firmly rooted in our national
consciousness." 4 s Precisely how such an attitude had become a constitutionally impermissible legislative motivation he omitted to say. How
it came to be any proper business of his to banish it from the realm was
not explained. The number of Americans, men. and women, who benightedly still cling to "notions" such as Justice Bradley's, quoted in the
plurality opinion, "9 was presumably unknown to Justice Brennan, and
was apparently of no concern. It was enough for him that such attitudes
are "traditional" and "old-fashioned" to run them off the field of political battle.
IV
It would be wrong to conclude, with Judge Wright, from this that
Bickel's ideal Justices would "become adept at sitting on their hands." '
He fully realized that the Constitution is itself one of the repositories of
the nation's evolving principle, and that the evolution of constitutional
principle requires, no less than any other, adaptation to changing ciicumstances, sometimes in bold measure. He knew also that there exists
no clearly discernible fixed line of demarcation separating constitutional
adjudication from the broader workings of politics. He was aware that
though federal judges are exempt from retirement by the electorate,
they are not entirely insulated from the salutary restraints imposed, at
least in the long run, by the limits of popular acquiescence in their decisions. In sum, he differed only as a matter of degree with Professor Cox
4

7Id. at 684.
48Id.
49
"Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say the identity, of interests and
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the
idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband ....

"... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973), quoting Bradwel v. State, 83 U.S.

(16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).

GoWright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
L. Ray. 769 (1971).

HA.v.
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and others more disposed than he to applaud reform and innovation carried out under judicial auspices.
What troubled Bickel most, however, was the expansive, incautious,
sometimes almost domineering spirit which he discerned in some of the
Court's most important opinions of recent times, wherein the Justices
seemed nearly to forget that they are, after all, only judges-judges
who, to be sure, exercise a uniquely exalted authority by virtue of which
they are sometimes called upon to be statesmen. But they are not true
to their office when they assume the mantle of oracles, as though commissioned to act together as anything like "midwife to a newer world,"'"
in Leonard Levy's ludicrously fawning phrase.
In addition to urging upon the Justices the wisdom of the Brandeisian canons of self-restraint, and the Frankfurterian duty of producing
finely-crafted and intellectually honest opinions, Bickel counseled that
the Constitution be once again viewed as "a series of admonitions, an
eighteenth-century checklist of subjects," rather than as a fund of "defi52
nite comprehensive answers on matters of social and economic policy.
"Once again" is inserted advisedly, since the disposition to look to the
Constitution for answers to virtually every question of public policy,
ranging from how school children should be disciplined to how state
unemployment compensation funds should be administered, represents
a fairly recent recrudescence of the supposedly discredited attitude associated with Lochner v. New York"8 and its ilk. Giving free rein to
51 L. Levy, Introduction, THE SuREamm CoURT UNDER EARL WARREN 3 (L. Levy ed.
1972).
52 BicxEL, supra note 1, at 25-26.
58198 U.S. 45 (1905). The spirit of unabashed interventionism, which this decision
is always cited as exemplifying par- excellence, was most tellingly betrayed by Justice
Peckham when he stated regarding state legislation designed to safeguard the health of
citizens generally: "We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this
law." Id. at 61. Despite the tone of repugnance with which the modem Court unfailingly
mentions this decision, it is not itself above Lochnerizing-to both adopt and adapt
Professor Ely's awkward but useful term-with a vengeance. Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 944 (1973). Thus, Justice Blackmun's response to Missouri's attempted justification for requiring parental consent for
abortions on minors below the age of 18 on the ground that it furthered the interest in
maintaining parental authority:
One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the family unit and of parental
authority. . . . It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with
absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor
patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family
unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or
control where the minor and the non-consenting parent are so fundamentally in
conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. CL 2831, 2844 (1976).
Like Justice Peckham's views on public health measures, Justice Blackmun's understanding of the social psychology of family life might well be superior to the legislature's.
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that disposition inevitably draws more and more issues within the ambit
of governance by constitutional mandate, and works an accompanying
atrophication of evolving principle. The Warren Court was especially
inclined to idealize the efficacy of democratic processes in the abstract,
but quite ready to condemn judgments actually reached by them.
To check this tendency, Bickel thought the courts should confine
themselves to what he called "middle-distance principles."" These are
principles which can be developed and elaborated on the basis of modest,
cogently-reasoned extrapolation from settled constitutional understandings. Change there concededly must be, the full burden of which cannot
be borne by the amending process, but its pace and amplitude should be
cautiously incremental. Although he did not cite it as such, Bickel would
5
almost certainly have approved the result in Griswold v. Connecticut"
as firmly grounded in middle-distance principles, though his approval
would more likely have been couched in terms of Justice Harlan's concurrence than in the free-wheeling lyrics of Justice Douglas's opinion
for the Court. From the latter would spring a newly-minted, free-floating,
generalized "right to privacy" which in Roe and its progeny, turned out
to be a right not to have one's conduct constrained by law when the
Justices concluded that it was inappropriate to do so. Until these decisions, whose presiding spirits were apparitions to which Justice Douglas
had whimsically given the names "penumbras" and "emanations," 50 such
resolute indifference to anything in the text or prior interpretation of the
Constitution, even while striking down statutes by its authority, had not
been seen since the palmiest days of Justice Peckham.
The reason why Griswold, in contrast to Roe and its sequels, exemplified middle-distance principles is that the interests protected were,
if not identical to, yet persuasively extended from, interests long established under fourth amendment decisions. The Court believed that the
Connecticut anti-contraception statute would require for its enforcement
searches and seizures so inherently offensive as to be unreasonable even
if a warrant was obtained. Not only did the decision constitute only a
modest extrapolation from precedent, but the Court's power was exerted
But to use the due process clause as a vehicle for overriding the latter is nothing else but
Lochnerizing. In fact, it is only by restricting the kind of parental authority which a state
may legitimately maintain to moral suasion that Justice Blackmun can say that giving

parents a "veto power" over their minor child's decision to abort will not enhance their

authority. Why states are precluded from preserving a kind of parental authority more

closely resembling that exercised by the Court of which Justice Blackmun is a member
was not dearly explained.
54
BIcxEL, supra note 1, at 25.
55381 U.S. 479 (1965).

56 Id. at 484.
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in conformity with what certainly must have been popular sensibilities
respecting what police should be permitted to do.
The contrast with what the Court did in Roe could hardly be more
striking. In the latter, on the level of judicial technique, Justice Blackmun's opinion barely troubled to specify which provisions of the Constitution, aside from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
were controlling. The broadly cited precedents were so far afield and
wide-ranging that they could have been invoked to support virtually
anything the Court was prepared to hold. Many of the cases cited
were decided under the aegis of Lochner and were instinct with its
spirit, though the opinion began with assurance that the Court would
never do that sort of thing again,57 after which it proceeded to do precisely that sort of thing. More to the point, because perfectly illustrative
of what middle-distance principles are distinctly not, the Court proceeded
to set aside, not a disused statute which was substantively an aberration
that fairly invited procedural grotesqueries, but an enactment representative of the expressed, considered judgment reached by the majority of
state legislatures respecting the nature of fetal life and the protection
it should be afforded.
Those who look to courts to be midwives of new worlds, or to
ensure that government at every level conforms itself to the changing
national conscience in case the electorate falters in this regard, will
surely object that Bickel's notion of middle-distance principles implies
too self-effacing, not to say supine, a role for courts. Their function thus
conceived, there would not be much for judges to do but manage the
conduct of litigation, find facts or oversee their finding, apply the law
and on occasion modestly improve it, and keep intact the established
principles of the Constitution, while not undertaking often or in large
measure to improve on them. Judges who confined themselves to those
limited, work-a-day tasks would doubtless be regarded by Judge Wright
as doing nothing but sitting on their hands. That a Holmes or a Cardozo
would certainly have regarded such a conclusion as beyond comprehension betokens how far many "new liberals" have departed from those
from whom they claim political descent in their attitude toward judicial
power and its place in a democracy.
57 410 U.S. at 117.

